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Abstract
This article uses the Occupy Central social movement in Hong Kong as a natural experiment 
to consider whether Asian culture influences the understanding and exercise of fundamental 
rights. In an earlier article, the author explored the relationship between Chinese culture and 
the rule of law as measured by the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. This article relies 
on the earlier work, but expands the analysis to consider Asian culture while at the same time 
focusing specifically on the fundamental rights aspect of the rule of law index. This article shows 
a strong correlation between lower scores for Asian countries on Individualism, as measured by 
the Hofstede Dimensions of Culture, and scores on fundamental rights, protection for freedom 
expression, and protection for freedom of association, as measured by the World Justice Project 
Index. This correlation is reflected by the Occupy Central movement. Although the movement 
was an exercise in fundamental rights, its purpose was to promote the rights of the community 
and the protests were carried out in a manner to reduce the impact on community rights When 
the movement ended, the negative consequences for the community were a significant reason, 
and the leaders of the movement were ultimately prosecuted for inciting a public nuisance.
Keywords: rule of law, culture, fundamental rights, freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, occupy central 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 2014, citizens of Hong Kong participated in mass 
protests about the selection process for Hong Kong’s Chief Executive. 
These protests, known as “Occupy Central”1 were in part to support 
1  Central is a designation for an area in the business district of Hong Kong. The social 
movement that predated the mass protests in Central was known as “Occupy Central 
with Love and Peace.” See Kin-man Chan, “Occupying Hong Kong: How delibera-
tion, referendum and civil disobedience play out in the Umbrella Movement”, Sur 
Journal, vol. 12, no. 21, August 2015, p. available at: https://sur.conectas.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Sur-21_Kin-man-Chan_en.pdf, accessed on 11 April 2019. 
Some accounts use the full name of the movement, some use an abbreviation (OCLP), 
some just refer to Occupy Central, and some refer to the Umbrella Movement. For this 
article, the terms Occupy Central or the movement will be used to refer to the protests 
by which several locations were occupied for an extended period. The title Occupy 
Central with Love and Peace or the abbreviation OCLP will be used for the organized 
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student protests and in reaction to police use of force against the students, 
but they were also a manifestation of public support for a larger social 
and political movement that had begun more than a year before. A large 
number of people, including many, perhaps mostly, students, continued 
the protest by occupying three areas in Hong Kong for 79 days. This 
was a remarkable, unprecedented, social and political event in Hong 
Kong. Protesters exercised their rights of expression and association 
under the Hong Kong Basic Law in a significant and dramatic way.  
This movement, with such robust and significant expression of 
fundamental rights, presents a kind of natural experiment to consider 
the relationship between culture and the fundamental rights that 
are part of the rule of law. In prior work, the author has suggested 
Chinese culture limits the development of rule of law.2 In particular, 
the collectivist orientation in Chinese culture was found to reflect “a 
cultural limitation on the protection of individual rights” such that 
countries with Chinese culture “are unlikely to ever provide the level 
of protection [for fundamental rights] afforded in individualistically 
oriented countries.”3 Occupy Central provided an historical event to 
evaluate the earlier finding. The analysis below will show that Occupy 
Central, while being an expression of fundamental rights of freedom of 
speech and association, also illustrates the limitation on those rights due 
to a collectivist cultural tendency.   
This article will begin with a description of rule of law data in 
general, and the fundamental rights data and scores in particular, from 
the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. In the second section, 
the article will use the work of the social psychologist Geert Hofsetde 
to show the tendency of Asian culture to favor the community over 
the individual. That tendency will then be compared to the rule of law 
data for fundamental rights, and will show a correlation between a 
preference for the individual and protection of fundamental rights. In 
the third section, the article shows how the Occupy Central movement 
reflects the cultural values for protection of the community. It will show 
social movement that pre-dated the actual protests. 
2  Jeffrey E. Thomas, “Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics: An Empirical Cul-
tural Perspective on China, Hong Kong and Singapore”, Asia Pacific Law Review, 
vol. 22, no. 1, 2014. 
3  Ibid., p. 140. 
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these values in the objectives of the movement, the procedures used 
during the movement, and the reasons for concluding the occupation 
and protests. 
II. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX
The World Justice Project is a non-profit organization that was 
founded in 2006. Its goal “is to advance the rule of law around the 
world.”4 In seeking to advance this goal, the World Justice Project 
developed an index to perform a quantitative assessment of a country’s 
adherence to rule of law.5 This assessment relies on data from a general 
population poll and a questionnaire administered to legal experts in 
each country.6 The 2019 index covers 126 countries and jurisdictions, 
with data collected through more than 120,000 household surveys and 
3,800 expert surveys.7 The index seeks to measure the rule of law as 
it is practiced, not based on law “on the books,” and its surveys are 
comprehensive, multi-dimensional and oriented to the perspective or 
ordinary people.8 
A country’s scores are built from 500 variables.9 General population 
survey respondents answer “127 perception-based questions and 213 
experience based questions.”10 The expert survey respondents are “in-
country professionals with expertise in civil and commercial law, criminal 
and constitutional law, labor law, and public health.”11 Expert surveys 
include “close-ended perception questions and several hypothetical 
scenarios with highly detailed factual assumptions aimed at ensuring 
comparability across countries.”12 After cleaning the data by excluding 
partial surveys, suspicious data, and outliers, survey responses are 
“mapped onto the 44 sub-factors” or “onto the intermediate categories 
4  Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, Joel Martinez, Alejandro Ponce & Christine S. 
Pratt, The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2012–2013, World Justice Project, available 
at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/publications/rule-law-index-reports/wjp-rule-law-
index-2012-2013-report, accessed on 11 April 2019, p 1.
5  Ibid., p. 2.
6  Ibid. p. 1.
7  World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2019, World Justice Project, available 
at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/publications/rule-law-index-reports/wjp-
rule-law-index-2019, accessed on 16 March 2019, p. 5. 
8  Ibid., p. 8.
9  Ibid., p. 161.
10  Ibid.  
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid. 
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that make up each sub-factor.”13 The responses are then “codified so 
that all values fall between 0 (weakest adherence to the rule of law) and 
1 (strongest adherence to the rule of law), and aggregated at the country 
level using the simple (or unweighted) average of all respondents.”14 
The World Justice Project developed its index based on four universal 
principles: accountability, just law, open government, and accessible 
and impartial dispute resolution.15 These four principles are measured by 
reference to eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence 
of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, 
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice.16 These eight 
factors are broken down into 44 sub-factors.17 For example, factor 1, 
Constraints on Government Powers, has six sub-factors: government 
powers are effectively limited by the legislature, government powers are 
effectively limited by the judiciary, government powers are effectively 
limited by independent auditing and review, government officials are 
sanctioned for misconduct, government powers are subject to non-
governmental checks, and transition of power is subject to the law.18 
This article focuses on factor 4, fundamental rights. The Index 
includes fundamental rights because it recognizes “that the rule of law 
must be more than merely a system of rules – that indeed, a system of 
positive law that fails to respect core human rights established under 
international law is at best ‘rule by law’, and does not deserve to be 
called a rule of law system.”19  After much debate about the scope of the 
rights to be included in the index, the World Justice Project decided to 
“focus on a relatively modest menu of rights that are firmly established 
under international law and are most closely related to rule of law 
concerns.”20 Factor 4, Fundamental Rights, has eight sub-factors: equal 
treatment & absence of discrimination, the right to life & security of 
the person, due process of law and rights of the accused, freedom of 
opinion and expression, freedom of belief & religion, freedom from 
arbitrary interference with privacy, freedom of assembly & association, 
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid., p. 9.
16  Ibid., p.10.
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid.
19  Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, Joel Martinez, Alejandro Ponce & Chris-
tine S. Pratt, see note 5, p. 14. 
20  Ibid.
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and fundamental labor rights.21 
A. COMPARISONS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The average score for protection of fundamental rights in East Asia 
and the Pacific22 for 2019 was 0.56.23 However, this figure includes 
both Australia (0.79) and New Zealand (0.80), which are culturally 
closer to the United Kingdom and Europe than to Asia. When those 
two countries are excluded, the average for East Asia and the Pacific 
drops to 0.52.24 By comparison, the average score for Europe, the 
European Union Free Trade Association and North America (hereinafter 
shortened to “Europe-North America”)25 for 2019 was 0.77,26 which 
was 0.21 higher than East Asia and the Pacific. This is not surprising, 
as the Europe-North America region has a strong cultural commitment 
to both fundamental rights and rule of law. All of the top ten countries 
in the world for fundamental rights are in the Europe-North American 
region,27 as are nine out of the top ten countries for rule of law overall 
21  World Justice Project, see note 8, p. 10.
22  East Asia and the Pacific is the regional designation used by the Index that includes 
Hong Kong, Indonesia and China. The list of countries included is: Australia, Cam-
bodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. Ibid., p. 18.
23  This average was calculated from the 2019 fundamental rights scores for the 
countries included in the East Asia and Pacific region. Ibid., p. 25. The average was 
0.558667, but was rounded up to 0.56.  
24  This average used the same 2019 data as was used in note 23, except that Australia 
and New Zealand were omitted. The calculation came to 0.522308, but was rounded 
down to 0.52. 
25  The European Union, European Free Trade Association, and North America is 
a regional designation used by the Index that includes Western Europe, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The list of countries included in this regional des-
ignation is as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and 
United States. Ibid., p. 19.  
26  This average was calculated from the 2019 fundamental rights scores for the coun-
tries included in the European Union, the European Free Trade Association, and North 
America region. Ibid., p. 25. The average was 0.774167, but was rounded down to 
0.77. If Australia and New Zealand were included with the other countries in this 
region, which would be more culturally appropriate then including them in East Asia 
and the Pacific, the average score would rise to 0.775385, which, with rounding, 
would be 0.78. 
27  Ibid., p. 25. The top ten, in order, for Fundamental Rights were: Finland (0.92), 
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(with the one exception being New Zealand, which is culturally close to 
Europe-North America).28 
The graphics below show the two regions’ average scores for all 
eight factors based on data collected for the 2017 index:
Figure 1. East Asia & the Pacific Region Compared to Europe-North America29
These graphics show that Europe-North America has significantly 
higher average scores than East Asia and the Pacific on all eight rule of 
law factors, and that the largest difference is on factor 4, fundamental 
rights. 
Another way to see the differences between the Europe-North 
Denmark (0.92), Norway (0.90), Sweden (0.86), Austria (0.85), Germany (0.85), Bel-
gium (0.84), Netherlands (0.84), Canada (0.83), Estonia (0.83) and United Kingdom 
(0.82). The United States ranked 27th on this factor. The highest ranked country in the 
East Asia and Pacific region was New Zealand (0.80), ranked 12th, and the highest 
ranked culturally Asian country was Japan (0.78), ranked 17th. 
28  Ibid., p. 16. The top ten ranked countries, in order, were: Denmark (0.90), Norway 
(0.89), Finland (0.87), Sweden (0.85), Netherlands (0.84), Germany (0.84), Austria 
(0.82), New Zealand (0.82), Canada (0.81), and Estonia (0.81). The highest ranked 
culturally Asian country was Singapore (0.80). 
29  World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, available at: https://
worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-
2017%E2%80%932018, accessed on 12 April 2019, p. 18-19. These graphics were 
not generated for the 2019 Index.   
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America countries and East Asia and the Pacific is to look at individual 
countries’ scores and rankings on fundamental rights. The table below 
shows countries in the two regions side-by-side by fundamental rights 
score and rank from the 2019 Index:
Table 1. Fundamental Rights Scores and Rankings Compared: Europe-North America to East Asia 
and the Pacific30
Country Score
Global 
Factor 
Rank
Country Score
Global 
Factor 
Rank
Finland 0.92 1 Hungary 0.58 56
Denmark 0.9 2 Greece 0.66 36
Norway 0.92 3 Poland 0.66 38
Sweden 0.86 4 Croatia 0.65 39
Austria 0.84 5 New Zealand 0.8 12
Germany 0.85 6 Australia 0.79 13
Belgium 0.84 7 Japan 0.78 17
Netherlands 0.84 8 South Korea 0.74 22
Canada 0.83 9 Singapore 0.69 30
Estonia 0.83 10 Hong Kong 0.66 33
United Kingdom 0.82 11 Mongolia 0.58 57
Portugal 0.79 14 Indonesia 0.52 82
Czech Republic 0.78 15 Malaysia 0.48 90
Spain 0.78 16 Thailand 0.48 89
France 0.74 20 Vietnam 0.46 97
Slovenia 0.73 23 Philippines 0.42 105
Italy 0.73 25 Cambodia 0.35 117
United States 0.72 27 China 0.32 121
Romania 0.7 29 Myanmar 0.31 123
Bulgaria 0.6 51
This table shows that the Europe-North American region has much 
stronger scores on protection of fundamental rights. The lowest country 
in that region is Hungary (a former member of the Soviet bloc), with a 
score of 0.58 and a rank of 56th. Nine out of the fifteen countries in the 
East Asia and the Pacific region scored below Hungary on protection 
of fundamental rights, and three out of the fifteen (Cambodia, China, 
30  World Justice Project, see note 8, at p. 25.
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and Myanmar) score in the bottom 10% on protection of fundamental 
rights for the 126 countries included in the index. Japan, which is the 
highest scoring country on the factor with Asian culture, scored at about 
the mid-point of the Europe-North America region, tied with the Czech 
Republic and Spain. 
B. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
A country’s score for fundamental rights is an average of its scores 
for the eight sub-factors. The two sub-factors most relevant to the 
analysis of this article are sub-factors 4.4, freedom of opinion and 
expression (hereafter shortened to “freedom of expression”), and 4.7 
freedom of assembly and association (hereafter shortened to “freedom 
of association”).31 These two factors were directly involved in the 
Occupy Central as the protestors were exercising both freedom of 
expression and freedom of association. The chart below provides the 
country scores and global ranking for these two sub-factors for all of 
the countries in the East Asia and the Pacific region, except Australia 
and New Zealand, which were excluded as being significantly different 
in their culture. 
31  Ibid., p. 12. The other six factors not included in this analysis are equal treatment 
& absence of discrimination, the right to life & security of the person, due process of 
law and rights of the accused, freedom of belief & religion, freedom from arbitrary 
interference with privacy, and fundamental labor rights.
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Table 2. Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Association Scores for East Asia and the Pacific 
(excepting Australia and New Zealand)32
Country
Funda-
mental 
Rights
Global 
Rights 
Rank
Freedom 
of Expres-
sion
Expres-
sion 
Rank
Freedom 
of Asso-
ciation
Asso-
ciation 
Rank
Japan 0.78 17 0.72 23 0.73 35
South Korea 0.74 22 0.65 40 0.69 45
Singapore 0.69 30 0.50 85 0.49 98
Hong Kong 0.66 33 0.57 70 0.62 69
Mongolia 0.58 57 0.63 47 0.68 47
Indonesia 0.52 82 0.67 37 0.66 54
Malaysia 0.48 90 0.46 93 0.44 104
Thailand 0.48 89 0.52 82 0.46 103
Vietnam 0.46 97 0.40 105 0.37 114
Philippines 0.42 105 0.56 73 0.57 84
Cambodia 0.35 117 0.31 116 0.41 108
China 0.32 121 0.12 125 0.17 125
Myanmar 0.31 123 0.40 107 0.35 115
Average 0.52  0.50  0.51  
This table shows that, in general, the sub-factor scores for freedom 
of expression and freedom of association are lower than the scores for 
the fundamental rights factor. The average fundamental rights score for 
this group was 0.52 compared to an average score of 0.50 for freedom 
of expression and 0.51 for freedom of association. Japan, which has the 
highest score and ranking in this group for fundamental rights (0.78, 
global rank 17), has a lower scores for freedom of expression (0.72, 
global rank 23) and freedom of association (0.73, global rank 35).
32  This table was generated from data included in the Rule of Law Index 2019. The 
author obtained the data in a spreadsheet from the World Justice Project website. See 
World Justice Project, “Current and Historical Data”, available at:  https://worldjus-
ticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2019/current-histor-
ical-data, accessed on 12 March 2019. The reader can verify scores for individual 
countries by going to the country reports in the Index. See, for example, “Japan Coun-
try Report”, World Justice Project Rule, see note 8, p. 91. The Index did not include 
global rankings on sub-factors. Those were calculated by putting sub-factor scores 
in rank-order. As has been the custom with the Index, the scores and averages were 
rounded to two decimal places.
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Singapore is perhaps the most dramatically different country, with a 
freedom of expression score of 0.50, which is a global rank of 85. This 
is much lower than its overall fundamental rights score of 0.69, and 
its rank of 30th. Singapore’s score for freedom of association is 0.49, 
which is 0.01 lower than its expression score, leading to a global rank 
of 98. 
Myanmar, Mongolia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are interesting 
exceptions where their scores and rankings for freedom of expression 
and freedom of association are significantly higher than their overall 
scores for fundamental rights. Myanmar’s score for fundamental 
rights was 0.31 (global rank 123, last), while its score for freedom of 
expression was 0.40 (global rank 107), and its score for freedom of 
association was 0.35 (global rank 115). Mongolia’s fundamental rights 
score was 0.58, (global rank 57), but its freedom of expression score 
was 0.63 (global rank 47) and its freedom of association score was 0.68 
(global rank 47). Indonesia’s score for freedom of expression was 0.67 
(global rank of 37) and for freedom of association was 0.66 (global rank 
54) compared to its overall fundamental rights score of 0.52 (global 
rank 82). The Philippines had a score of 0.42 (global rank 105) for 
fundamental rights, but improved to 0.56 (global rank 73) for freedom 
of expression and to 0.57 (global rank 84). 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the scores for the freedom of 
expression and freedom of association sub-factors are significantly 
lower in East Asia and the Pacific compared to Europe-North America. 
The average of the scores for freedom of expression in Europe-North 
America is 0.76, and the average for freedom of association is 0.80, 
compared to averages of 0.50 and 0.51 for East Asia and the Pacific.33 
Mongolia (0.63/0.68), Indonesia (0.67/0.66), and the Philippines 
(0.56/0.57), the three countries that scored higher on the sub-factors 
than on the general fundamental rights factor, were all still lower than 
the averages of 0.76 and 0.80 in Europe-North America. The lowest 
scores for these two sub-factors in the Europe-North America group 
was for Hungary, 0.48 on both sub-factors.34 Although this is below 
the average for East Asia and the Pacific, it is higher than five out of 
33  The average scores for Europe-North America were calculated by the author based 
on the scores reported in the 2019 Index. The scores for East Asia and the Pacific 
were calculated for table 2 using the same data, but scores from Australia and New 
Zealand were excluded from the calculations because they are not culturally Asian. 
See note 33.
34  World Justice Project, see note 8, p. 85 (Hungary’s country report).
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the thirteen countries in East-Asian and the Pacific for freedom of 
expression, and is higher than six countries in that region for freedom 
of association.35 We now turn to turn to a possible cultural explanation 
for these differences. 
III.  ASIAN CULTURE REGARDING THE INDIVIDUAL
Although there are many ways one might try to measure culture, for 
the purposes of this article, we turn to the work of Geert Hofstede, a social 
psychologist who identifed several dimentions of national culture while 
working on transnational management issues with IBM.36 Based on data 
collected from more than 116,000 questionnaires from IBM employees 
and business school students from 72 countries,37 Hofstede identified 
four dimensions of national cultures: power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, and masculinity.38 Subsequent work done in 
collaboration with Michael Harris Bond in exploring Asian cultures and 
seeking to avoid Western bias resulted in the development of a fifth 
dimesion, originally labeled long-term orientation39 which is now called 
pragmatism.40 These dimensions of culture have been validated, and the 
measures and outcomes have been replicated.41 
This article focuses on the factor known as individualism because it 
may have some explanatory power for the tendency for Asian countries 
to have lower scores on fundamental rights.42 A national culture’s 
35  For freedom of expression, Hungary scored 0.48, which was higher than Malay-
sia (0.46), Myanmar (0.40), Vietnam (0.40), Cambodia (0.31), and China (0.12). For 
freedom of association, Hungary also scored 0.48, which was higher than Thailand 
(0.46), Malaysia (0.44), Cambodia (0.41), Vietnam (0.37), Myanmar (0.35), and Chi-
na (0.17). See Table 2. 
36  See generally Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values, Sage, 1980. After more than two decades of subsequent work and validation, 
the second edition was published in 2001. See Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Com-
paring Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations, second edition, Sage, 
2001. All subsequent citations will be to the second edition. 
37  Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, see note 33, p. 41. 
38  Ibid. p. 58.
39  Ibid. p. 69–71. 
40  See Geert Hofstede, “The 6-D model of national culture”, available at: https://geerthofstede.
com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/, accessed on 23 
March 2019.
41  Geert Hofstede, see note 37, pp. 65–68. 
42  The other dimensions of national culture are Power Distance Index, Masculinity, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, and Pragmatism. Power Distance Index is a measure of at-
Jeffrey E. Thomas
148
preference for individualism is evaluated in compairson to that country’s 
preference towards collectivity. The individualism dimension “describes 
the relationship between the individual and the collectivity that prevails 
in a given society.”43 A high score on this dimesion suggests a greater 
feeling of individual independence. “It meas that invidivual choices and 
decisions are expected.” 44 On the other hand, a low score “means that 
one ‘know one’s place’ in life, which is determined socially. With a 
metaphor from physics, people in an individualist society are more like 
atoms flying around in a gas while those in collectivist societies are more 
like atoms fixed in a crystal.”45 Countries with a higher invidualism 
score, who therefore place a higher value on the invidual compared to 
groups, seem more likely to have greater protection for fundamental 
rights of individuals.
As might be expected, Asian countries tend to have a lower score on 
the individuality dimension than countries in Europe and North America. 
Table 3, below, provides the individualism scores for countries in the 
Europe-North America and East Asia and the Pacific groups.46 Because 
Australia and New Zealand are reported separately, under the heading 
of Oceania, they are shown as a separate geographic grouping in this 
table. The high scores in Australia and New Zealnad for individualism 
show their cultural similarity to Europe and North American rather than 
the other countries in East Asia and the Pacific. 
titudes towards inequality. Geert Hofstede, see note 37, p. 79. Masculity is a measure 
of preferences for male-oriented ego goals such as careers and money. Ibid. p. at 279. 
Uncertainty Avoidance is a measure of society’s preference to deal with uncertainty 
“through the domains of technology, law, and religion.” Ibid. p. 145. Pragmatism is 
the measure of characteristics associated with Chinese culture, such as persistence, 
ordering relationships by status and observing that order, thrift, and a sense of shame 
on the long-term side, and, on the short-term side, values of personal steadiness and 
stability, protecting one’s ‘face,’ respect for tradition, and reciprocation of greetings, 
gifts and favors. Ibid. pp. 352-353. These dimensions may well be correlated with 
certain tendencies for Asian countries regarding rule of law, but because this article 
is focused on the Occupy Central movement, it has focused on the individualism 
dimension in that the movement exercised freedom of expression and freedom of as-
sociation.
43  Ibid. p. 209.
44  Geert Hofstede, see note 41. 
45  Ibid.
46  These scores were obtained from geerthofstede.com and are the data used in the 
2015 version of his books. “Dimension data matrix”, available at: https://geerthof-
stede.com/research-and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/, accessed on 23 March 2019. 
Scores were not available for Cambodia, Mongolia, or Myanmar.
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Table 3. Individualism Scores for countries in the Europe-North America and East Asia and the 
Pacific Groups
Europe-North Am. Oceania E. Asia & Pacific
Country IDV Country IDV Country IDV
US 91 Australia 90 Japan 46
UK 89 New Zealand 79 Philippines 32
Netherlands 80 Malaysia 26
Canada 80 Hong Kong 25
Hungary 80 Singapore 20
Italy 76 Thailand 20
Belgium 75 China 20
Denmark 74 South Korea 18
Swedan 71 Indonesia 14
France 71 Cambodia NA
Norway 69 Mongolia NA
Germany 67 Myanmar NA
Finland 63
Estonia 60
Poland 60
Czech Repub. 58
Austria 55
Spain 51
Greece 35
Croatia 33
Romania 30
Bulgaria 30
Portugal 27
Slovenia 27
Although a few countries at the bottom of the Europe-North America 
group have scores comparable to the East Asia and the Pacific countries, 
the great majority of Europe-North America countries have much higher 
individualism scores. The average score for Europe-North America is 
60.5, compared to an average of 24.56 for East Asia and the Pacific. 
The highest score for an East Asia country is 46 for Japan, which is well 
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below the average for Europe-North America. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, below, and Appendix 1, the individualism 
scores are strongly correlated to fundamental rights and the sub-
factors of freedom of expression and freedom of association. When the 
data are compared for the full set of countries in the two groups, the 
correlation between individualism and fundamental rights is 0.6134.47 
The correlation is slightly stronger for the two subfactors: 0.6399 
for freedom of expression and 0.6408 for freedom of association.48 
These correlations are statistically signifiant to a 99% level.49 These 
correlations support the theory that the cultural value for individualism 
is part of the explanation for higher scores in protection of fundamental 
rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of association in the 
combined groups. 
Figure 2. Individualism Correlated with Fundamental Rights, Freedom of Expression, and 
Freedom of Association
While difference in the cultural value of individualism helps to explain 
the scores in the group as a whole, the correlations are much weaker 
when the groups are separated. The correlations within the Europe-
North American group are only 0.3772 for fundamental rights, 0.4534 
47  See Appendix 1.
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid.
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for freedom of expression, and 0.3929 for freedom of Assocation.50 
These correlations are significant to a 90% level for fundameant 
rights and freedom of association, and to a 95% level for freedom of 
expression.51 For the East Asia and the Pacific, the correlations are even 
weaker (though because of the small number of countries for which 
we have data, the correlations for East Asia and the Pacific are not 
statistically significant). For fundamental rights, the correlation with 
individualism is 0.3017. For freedom of expressioin the correlation is 
0.2973, and for freedom of association it is 0.3203.52 This suggests that 
while Asian cultural values may explain some of the difference between 
the groups, it explains much less of the difference within the groups. 
In other words, within the groups something other than the cultural 
commitment to individualism accounts for differences in the scores for 
fundamental rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. 
Specific examples within the groups show that some counties with 
low individualism scores may nevertheless have relatively high scores 
for fundamental rights and the related sub-factors. The most dramatic 
example of this is Indonesia, which has an individualism score of 14, 
the lowest score of all the countries compared. Notwithstanding this 
very weak cultural commitment to individuals, Indonesia’s score for 
fundamental rights of 0.52 was about at the average for East Asia and 
the Pacific group, but, remarkably, Indonesia’s scores for freedom 
of expression and freedom of association were 0.67, and 0.66, fairly 
close to the scores of Japan (0.72 and 0.73), which were the highest 
in the group.53 In the Europe-North America group, Portugal has an 
individualism score of 27, which is close to the average of the East Asia 
and the Pacific group, yet it scored 0.79 in fundamental rights, 0.81 in 
freedom of expression, and 0.86 in freedom of association.54 
Even though some countries are exceptional because, 
nothwithstanding lower individualism scores, they have higher than 
expected scores on fundamental rights, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of association, these data suggest that there may be an upper 
bound for protection of those rights for Asian countries. Japan has 
the highest score for individualsm of countries in the East Asia and 
the Pacific group (excepting Australia and New Zealand on cultural 
50  Ibid.
51  Ibid.
52  Ibid.
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid.
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grounds), a 46, but its scores for fundamental rights (0.78), freedom of 
expression (0.72) and freedom of association (0.73)55 are still below the 
averages for Europe-North America(0.80/0.78/0.80).56 Portugal is the 
country from the Europe-North America group that has one of the lowest 
individualism scores, a 27, yet still has robust protection for fundamental 
rights (0.79), freedom of expression (0.81), and freedom of association 
(0.86).57 However, while a 27 for individualism is exceptionally low for 
Europe-North America, it is still above average for East Asia and the 
Pacific. The examples of Japan and Portugal suggest that as countries 
in East Asia and the Pacific progress in rule of law, they can improve 
in the protection of fundamental rights, but it seems unlikely that they 
will surpass the protections provided by Japan, which is below the 
average of countries in Europe-North America. In other words, because 
of the weak cultural commitment to individualism, it seems unlikely the 
countries in East Asia and the Pacific will reach the level of protection 
of fundamental rights seen in Europe and North America. Japan’s score 
for fundamental rights, a respectable 0.78, seems likely to be about as 
high as a country will achieve in the East Asia and the Pacific group.
IV. OCCUPY CENTRAL AS A REFLECTION OF CULTURAL 
COMMITMENT TO THE COMMUNITY
The Occupy Central movement provides an historic narrative that 
provides another way to evaluate this theoru regarding the interaction 
of law and culture. The protesters exercised their fundamental rights 
of expression and association, which is what one would expect in a 
jurisdiction protecting the rule of law (as defined by the World Justice 
Project). But was there also evidence of the suggested limitation on 
protection of fundamental rights because of Asian culture’s weaker 
commitment to individualism? Does the historical narrative of Occupy 
Central support the theory that Asian culture bounds the protection of 
individual rights to some point below the level of protection afforded 
in Europe and North America? This section of the article answers those 
questions. 
55  Ibid. 
56  See Table 1.
57  See Appendix 1.
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A. THE OCCUPY CENTRAL STORY
Although the formal protests of the Occupy Central movement 
began in September of 2014,58 the work of the movement began more 
than a year before. Occupy Central with Love and Peace was started in 
an effort to mend a schism that developed within the pro-democracy 
supporters in 2012. The Democratic Party in 2012 participated in secret 
negotiations with Chinese officials about the reform of Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council. Some pro-democracy groups wanted to eliminate 
the “functional seats” of the council that were not elected, but were 
appointed to represent various constituencies. In the secret negotiations, 
the Democratic Party conceded an ongoing role for the functional seats 
in the council. This upset others seeking to promote democracy.59 To 
mend the schism, OCLP proposed to organize broad-based, civil-
society discussions about reforms followed by a non-governmental 
referendum.60 
Occupy Central with Love and Peace organized three waives of 
discussion days in 2013 and 2014. The first discussion took place at 
University of Hong Kong and was attended by approximately 700 
people from both moderate and more radical pro-democracy groups. 
The participants engaged in a rational discussion of concerns about 
proposed nominating committee to be used to select candidates for 
Chief Executive of Hong Kong.61 This initial discussion was followed 
by additional discussions with different community groups (e.g. 
university students, social workers, laborers, women, church groups, 
and the chronically ill) between October 2013, and January 2014. These 
58  Kin-man Chan, see note 2. Additional sources include: “Occupy Central is on: 
Benny Tai rides wave of student protest to launch movement”, South China Morning 
Post, 27 September 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/arti-
cle/1601625/hong-kong-students-beat-us-it-benny-tai-declares-start-occupy-central, 
accessed on 12 April 2019; “Thousands of Protestors Take to Streets for Second Night 
of Pro-Democracy Demonstrations”, South China Morning Post, 29 September 2014, 
available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1603817/riot-police-
withdrawn-defiant-protesters-dig-second-day-occupy, accessed on 12 April 2019; 
Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, “Crackdown on Protests by Hong Kong Police Draws 
More to the Streets”, New York Times, 29 September 2014, available at: https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/29/world/asia/clashes-in-hong-kong.html, accessed on 12 
April 2019.  
59   Kin-man Chan, see note 2, pp. 1-2. 
60  Ibid., p. 2.
61  Ibid., p. 2.
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discussions involved about 3000 participants.62 The third discussion 
day was held at five different locations simultaneously on May 4, 
2014, in which some 2500 citizens deliberated on 15 proposed reform 
proposals.63 At the end of the day, participants selected three proposals 
to be included in the referendum.64 
Even though the electronic voting system used for the referendum was 
subject to unprecedented attacks by hackers, ultimately, approximately 
800,000 Hong Kong residents voted in the non-governmental 
referendum. The proposal for the three-track system (civil, political 
party, or legislative council nomination) advanced by Alliance for True 
Democracy received the most votes.65 In addition, 88% of votes agreed 
that the Legislative Council “should veto any government proposal that 
did not meet international standards of universal suffrage.”66 
The referendum did not influence the Chinese government. A decision 
from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
August 31, 2014, adopted a nominating process consistent with current 
practice. Candidates for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong would be 
required to receive support from 50% of the nominating committee 
made up of 1,200 representatives from four sectors of society, and 
the number of candidates was to be restricted to no more than two or 
three.67 In response to this decision, Occupy Central with Love and 
Peace intended to launch protests on October 1, China’s National Day.68 
However, students were impatient so started an occupation of Civic 
Square on September 26.69 Shortly thereafter, some 50,000 people 
gathered outside the square in support of the students.70 In the early 
morning hours of September 28, Occupy Central with Love and Peace 
announced that the planned protests would begin immediately.71 
62  Ibid., p. 2.
63  Ibid., p. 3. 
64  Ibid., p. 3. 
65  Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid., p. 4.
68  Ibid.
69  “Occupy Central won’t start early, says Benny Tai, after student clashes with po-
lice leave dozens injured”, South China Morning Post, 26 September 2014, available 
at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1601262/chaotic-scenes-students-
break-civic-square-class-boycott-ends, accessed on 12 April 2019.    
70  Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 5.
71  Ibid.
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Police reacted to the protests with tear gas on Sunday, September 
28.72 Those who were occupying the area used umbrellas to protect 
themselves, resulting in the umbrella becoming a symbol of the 
movement.73 Images and reports of the police attacks against the 
protestors were shared on social media, television, and in the press, 
resulting in many people in Hong Kong rallying to the cause.74
Over the next two and one half months, the occupation of three areas 
in Hong Kong continued. During this time, protestors tried to open 
negotiations with government officials. Shortly after the protests began, 
a deputy to the Hong Kong Chief Executive met with students.75 Further 
meetings with the government, however, were called off by the students 
after clashes between students and pro-government supporters.76 About 
two weeks later student leaders and government officials debated on 
live television.77 In November, student leaders tried to travel to Beijing 
to confront Chinese leaders, but they were prevented from boarding the 
flight.78 
The beginning of the end of the occupation was triggered by a court 
order in mid-November refusing to hear the protesters’ appeal and 
refusing to stay the injunction against the occupation. With the appellate 
relief denied, the police were authorized to enforce the injunction and to 
begin clearing the occupation.79 The police cleared some of the site, but 
72  Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, see note 59. 
73  Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 5. 
74  Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, see note 59. 
75  Austin Ramzy and Keith Bradsher, “Hong Kong Leader Refuses to Resign, but 
Deputy to Meet with Protesters”, New York Times, 2 October 2014, available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html, accessed 
on 12 April 2019. 
76  “After angry mods turn on protesters, students call off talks”, South China Morn-
ing Post, 4 October 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ar-
ticle/1609166/after-angry-mobs-turn-protesters-students-call-talks, accessed on 12 
April 2019.
77  “Who’s who at Hong Kong’s students vs government debate”, South China Morn-
ing Post, 21 October 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/
article/1621237/who-who-tuesdays-dialogue-between-hong-kong-government-and-
students, accessed on 12 April 2019.   
78  Joyce Ng, Amy Nip, & Stuart Lau, “Beijing bans student leaders from taking trip 
to mainland to press for democracy”, South China Morning Post, 15 November 2014. 
79  Julie Chu and Bryan Harris, “Appeal court clear way for bailiffs to end Occupy 
protest in Mong Kok”, South China Morning Post, 16 November 2014, available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1640976/appeal-court-denies-hear-
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protestors tried to reclaim the site. A second order a few days later was 
also enforced.80 On December 3, 2014, the leaders of Occupy Central 
with Peace and Love call on the students to retreat from the protest 
sites, and, along with 60 protestors, the leaders turn themselves in to the 
Hong Kong Police. By December 15, 2014, the last of the protest sites 
was cleared.81 
B. ASIAN VALUES IN THE OCCUPY CENTRAL STORY
A closer look at the historical narrative of Occupy Central will 
show the Asian values of the activists in Hong Kong. The “universal 
suffrage” that was sought was more about the community’s right to 
elect people to represent it than about the individual’s right to vote. 
When protestors undertook the occupation of public spaces, they did 
so in a way that sought to reduce the impact on the community. When 
the occupation ended, it did so in large part out of concern for the 
community, reflecting a concern about the consequences of exercising 
the freedoms of expression and association.
1. Occupy Central’s Objective was to Promote Community Interests
The Occupy Central protestors were exercising their rights of 
expression and association to advance the interests of the community 
as a whole. The movement was a response to the Chinese government’s 
interpretation of the requirements of the hand-over agreement that 
Hong Kong move towards universal suffrage in the selection of the 
Chief Executive of Hong Kong.82 The Basic Law of Hong Kong 
provides in Article 45: “The ultimate aim [of the method for selection] 
ing-clearing-way-end-occupy-central-protests, accessed on 12 April 2019.  
80  Julie Chu, “High Court judge’s refusal to stall injunction gives green light for 
Admiralty clearance”, South China Morning Post, 5 December 2014, available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1656244/high-court-set-rule-occu-
py-protesters-bid-stall-admiralty-clearance, accessed on 12 April 2019.  
81  Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 6.
82  The idea for the Occupy Central movement can be traced to a column by Ben-
ny Tai Yiu-ting in the Hong Kong Economic Journal suggesting “10,000 people to 
block road in the financial heart of the city should the central and local governments 
create a system for the 2017 chief executive election that did not allow a ‘genuine’ 
choice of candidates.” Cary Cheung & Jeffie Lam, “Original Hong Kong Occupy Plan 
veered off script”, South China Morning Post, 3 December 2014, available at: https://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1654286/original-hong-kong-occupy-plan-
veered-script, accessed 29 March 2019. 
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is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon 
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in 
accordance with democratic procedures.”83 Although the press framed 
the Occupy Central movement about the right of universal suffrage, 
in fact the dispute was about the nomination procedures. The Chinese 
Government, in Standing Committee’s August 31 decision, outlined a 
nomination procedure that was consistent with current practice in Hong 
Kong. A candidate for Chief Executive would be nominated if he or 
she were to receive at least 50% endorsement from a 1200 member 
nominating committee representing four sectors of society.84 The pro-
democracy advocates were concerned that this method gave the Chinese 
government too much influence over the nomination process. Many of 
the nominating committee would be appointed by the government, and 
those members would work to prevent the nomination of any candidate 
disfavored by the Chinese government.85 
The discussion process organized by Occupy Central with Love and 
Peace generated proposals that would open the nomination process to a 
broader array of candidates. The three proposals voted on by the civic 
referendum were: 
1) Proposal of the Alliance for True Democracy: Nomination of 
candidates for Chief Executive through one of three possible 
channels: a. civil nomination (endorsement by 1% of registered 
votes), b. political party nomination (the political party must have 
received at least 5% of the valid votes in the prior Legislative Council 
elections), or c. nomination by the Legislative Council nominating 
committee.86 
2) People Power proposal: nomination by a nominating committee 
composed of all popularly elected district councilors and legislative 
councilors who would nominate candidates who had the endorsement 
of 1% of registered votes in a geographical constituency, the 
endorsement of 5% of legislative councilors, or the endorsement of 
83  Hong Kong Basic Law Art. 45. 
84  See note 68. 
85  “Hong Kong: Occupy Central anger over Beijing ruling”, BBC News, 31 August 
2014, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29004025, accessed 
on 12 April 2019.  
86  Proposals, PopVote, 6.20-29 Civil Referendum Proposals, available at: https://
popvote.hk/english/project/vote_622/proposal/, accessed in 12 April 2019/  
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5% of district councilors.87 
3) Students’ Proposal (from Hong Kong Federation of Students and 
Scholarism): nomination by a nominating committee comprised of 
all popularly elected legislative councilors who would nominate 
candidates who received endorsement from 1% of voters or 
endorsement or 8% of the nominating committee.88  
Because of disputes about the inclusion of public nomination 
in all three proposals, Occupy Central with Love and Peace “added 
an additional motion to the referendum to encourage those who did 
not support public nomination to take part [in the referendum]: ‘The 
Legislative Council should veto any proposed election method violating 
international standards of universal suffrage that fails to provide voters 
genuine choice.”89 
The first proposal, by the Alliance for True Democracy, received 
the largest number of votes, showing that what most people wanted 
was a nominating system that would provide more open pathways to 
nomination for the office of Chief Executive. While one could perhaps 
construe this expression of public opinion as an endorsement of an 
individual’s right to run for Chief Executive, the historical narrative 
shows that the concern was about community choice, and about 
reducing interference and manipulation by the Chinese government. The 
additional motion added to the referendum also reflects a community 
orientation. While the motion references the “international standards of 
universal suffrage,” the point of the motion is to allow voters “genuine 
choice” between candidates. This motion received a favorable vote 
from 88% of those who participated in the referendum,90 showing a 
strong community endorsement of the universal suffrage to give the 
community a choice in the selection of the Chief Executive.  
b. Occupy Central Protesters Sought to Reduce Impact to the Com-
munity
While the protesters were exercising their rights to free expression 
and association, an Asian orientation was reflected by steps protestors 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 3.
90  Ibid., p. 4. 
Rule of Law with Asian Characteristics
159
took to reduce the impact on the community. Admittedly, the occupation 
caused traffic problems. The authorities, sharing the same sense of 
community as the protestors, hoped that these traffic problems would 
cause the protestors to withdraw from their protests.91 Although the 
protestors did not withdraw to solve the traffic problems, they took 
steps to reduce the harmful consequences of the occupation. For 
example, a few days into the occupation, the protestors made way 
for civil service workers to return to their offices.92 Similarly, some 
protesters volunteered to direct pedestrian traffic to make movement 
in the occupied areas more efficient.93 The protestors also organized a 
system to recycling and trash collection system to minimize the impact 
of protestor waste.94 
While these efforts also improved the occupation experience for 
protestors, they show that the protesters were concerned about the 
comfort of others. In addition, the protesters’ efforts went beyond what 
was necessary for their own interests. Jason Ng, a lawyer, eyewitness, 
and participant in the occupation, provides an illustration that makes 
the community orientation clear: 
If [a protester] saw so much as a chewing gum splotch on the sidewalk, 
he would quietly pick up a putty knife and start scraping. Soon, two others 
like him would join in and a fledgling gum removal team would spring to 
life.95
The movement also tried to minimize the economic impact of 
the occupation. Originally, the occupation was scheduled to begin on 
October 1, a national holiday, to minimize economic impact.96 However, 
91  Ibid., p. 5.
92  Michael Forsythe & Alan Wong, “Protest Organizers Claim Progress for Hong 
Kong”, New York Times, 6 October 2014, available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/10/07/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html, accessed on 12 April 2019.  
93  Jason Y. Ng, Umbrellas in Bloom: Hong Kong’s occupy movement uncovered, 
Blacksmith Books, 2016, p. 167.
94  Ibid., p. 223 (waste management was a high priority). Jason Ng gives first-hand 
account of clean-up efforts: “Several times a day cleaning crews from the supply units 
fanned out across the village with rags, brushes and buckets. They scrubbed toilets, 
wiped counters, and replenished toilet paper.” Ibid. p. 234.
95  Ibid., p. 167.
96  Cheung and Lam, see note 83. 
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the government’s response to student protests created a unique moment 
that resulted in the occupation starting a few days earlier. In addition, 
the occupation lasted some 79 days, much longer than the three days 
originally planned.97 Consequently, the occupation had a negative impact 
on the local economy.98 Ultimately, these economic consequences were 
part of the reason for ending the occupation.99 
The movement stressed that protesters “must not engage in 
physical or verbal conflicts with law enforcers, nor damage any 
public properties.”100 To prevent violence, the movement provided 
non-violence workshops and deployed hundreds of stewards.101 For 
example, at the occupation site in Admiralty, 200 stewards were on duty 
97  Ibid. 
98  For example, sales were down by 46% at the Pacific Place mall next to the occupy 
site in Admiralty. See Tiffany Ap & Phila Siu, “46pc sale slump at Pacific Place, says 
tenant of upmarket mall”, South China Morning Post 1 December 2014, available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1653234/46pc-sales-slump-pacific-
place-says-tenant-upmarket-mall, accessed 2 April 2019. However, an analysis done 
by the World Bank found that the Occupy Central movement did not negatively affect 
the positive business environment in Hong Kong. See Sijia Jiang, “World Bank says 
Occupy protests fail to impact Hong Kong’s business climate”, South China Morn-
ing Post, 29 October 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/business/economy/
article/1627626/world-bank-says-occupy-protests-fail-impact-hks-business-climate, 
accessed 2 April 2019. 
99  “Occupy violence at Legco complex a step too far”, South China Morning Post, 
20 November 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/
article/1644066/occupy-violence-legco-complex-step-too-far, accessed 2 April 2019 
(“As acknowledged by one of the three core leaders [of Occupy Central], the dis-
ruptions and grievances caused by the Occupy movement have exceeded acceptable 
levels.”); Felix Chung, “End Occupy protests to give small businesses a chance to re-
cover, before it’s too late,” South China Morning Post, November 11, 2014, available 
at: https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1637478/end-occupy-
protests-give-small-businesses-chance-recover-its?page=all, accessed 2 April 2019.
100  Occupy Central with Love and Peace, “Manual of Disobedience”, 24 September 
2014, available at: https://oclphkenglish.wordpress.com/2014/09/24/manual-of-dis-
obedience/, accessed 2 April 2019. 
101  See Occupy Central with Love and Peace, “Basic Tenets”, available at https://
oclphkenglish.wordpress.com/about-2/tenets/, accessed 2 April 2019 (“Mandatory 
workshops on the art and skill of non-violence will be provided” . . . and “Hundreds 
of stewards will be deployed during Occupy Central to prevent rowdy behavior by or 
instigated by by-standers.”). 
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to keep the peace.102 Remarkably, these efforts to protect property were 
so effective that the occupation went for more than 50 days before a 
single piece of glass was broken.103 This non-violence was ended when 
a small group smashed two glass doors at the building that houses the 
Legislative Council.104 Although a few hundred protesters were at the 
scene, this was not the work of the movement, but instead an effort 
by a more radical minority of the protesters to end the stalemate with 
the government.105 Significantly, it was Occupy Central stewards who 
reported the incident to the police.106 
Another significant example of a community orientation in the 
movement was the commitment of protestors to continuing their studies. 
Twelve days into the occupation, volunteers built a “study corner” with 
tables, chairs, and LED lamps so that students could keep up on their 
school work.107 The study corner became so popular that it was expanded. 
By the end of October it had tripled in size, had two full-time volunteers 
to oversee it, and many volunteer tutors.108 According to Jason Ng, a 
journalist and adjunct law professor, this was “one of the most talked 
about features” of the movement: “protestors in full protective gear 
doing homework with pencils and highlighters. The phenomenon was 
bizarre, inspiring, and so very Hong Kong.”109 While on one hand the 
students were protecting themselves from the consequences of missing 
classes, it also shows the students’ commitment to community values of 
education and not disappointing their parents and elders. 
Of course, the protesters’ non-violence was a political strategy meant 
to build support for the protest movement. However, this non-violence 
102  Jason Y. Ng, see note 94, p. 232.
103  South China Morning Post, see note 99 (“Until yesterday, the world had been 
watching in amazement that our mass street protests had continued for more than 50 
days without a single piece of glass broken.”). 
104  Joyce Ng & Samuel Chan, “Occupy condemns attack on Legco as pan-democrats 
claim protesters were ‘misled’”, 19 November 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.
com/news/hong-kong/article/1643678/occupy-condemns-attack-legco-pan-demo-
crats-claim-protesters-were, accessed 2 April 2019. 
105  Ibid. 
106  Jason Y. Ng, see note 94, p. 144. 
107  Ibid., p. 175-76.
108  Ibid., p. 193-194. 
109  Ibid. p. 172.
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and respect for property also reflects the Asian cultural commitment to 
the interests of the community. While non-violence has been used by 
other protest movements, here it seemed to be extraordinary. Jason Ng 
summarized these efforts in these words: 
[The protesters] braved police crackdowns for their political ideals, but 
were never too busy to clean up after themselves or keep each other well-
fed. The occupy movement was bloodless, but it was also spotless and 
selfless. No wonder the foreign press called this “the most civilized street 
protest in the world.”110
Notwithstanding being “the most civilized street protest in the 
world,” the government prosecuted key leaders of the movement 
on criminal charges for inciting a public nuisance. This reflects the 
importance of community rights to avoid the inconvenience caused by 
the occupation. The court applied a “reasonableness test” to determine 
whether the protesters’ “conduct impinged unreasonably on the rights 
of others.”111 Although the court asserted that it was giving “substantial 
weight” to the protesters’ right to demonstrate under Hong Kong’s Basic 
Law,112 it concluded that “the obstruction in the planned occupation” 
impinged “unreasonably upon the rights of others” so much so “that the 
significant and protected right to demonstrate should be displaced.”113 
This “unreasonable” impingement was proven by evidence such as 
certificates showing “the number of public bus routes that had to be 
diverted or suspended” and “the number of passengers who would be 
affected.”114 
C. OCCUPY CENTRAL ENDED IN PART TO PROTECT 
COMMUNITY INTERESTS
While it is perhaps debatable whether the inconvenience caused by 
the occupation made the exercise of the protesters’ rights unreasonable, 
the leaders’ concern about the inconvenience was one of the reasons 
that the occupation ended. After the one episode of violence associated 
with a small group of protesters, one of the three core leaders of the 
110  Ibid. p. 151.
111  HKSAR v. Tai Yiu Ting, DCCC 480/2017, ¶ 68.
112  For example, see Ibid. ¶  278. 
113  Ibid. ¶¶ 363, 398 (“the obstruction that would be caused by the occupation . . . 
made the obstruction an unreasonable use of the carriageway in or in the neighbour-
hood of Central”). 
114  Ibid. ¶ 381.
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movement concluded that “the disruptions and grievances caused by the 
Occupy movement have exceeded acceptable levels.”115 Another of the 
core leaders “resumed his teaching duties on campus” and suggested that 
“the least the protesters should do is make the occupied sites smaller.”116 
Benny Tai, whose essay about non-violence spurred the movement, 
reported at a press conference that, for “the sake of occupier safety and 
for the sake of the original intention of love and peace, as we prepare to 
surrender, we three [core leaders] urge students to retreat, to put down 
deep roots in the community and transform the movement to extend the 
spirit of the umbrella movement.”117 This “forthright and prominent” 
call gave voice to “deepening fears that the street occupations were 
angering residents and risking clashes with the police.”118 
Concerns of Hong Kong residents were reflected in responses to 
surveys about the movement. By late November, a University of Hong 
Kong survey showed “that nearly 83% of Hongkongers want[ed] the 
Occupy Central protests to stop, while more than two-thirds believe[d] 
the government should clear the protest sites.”119 This was a substantial 
erosion in support for the movement. In late October, support for the 
movement was growing.120 A series of surveys done by the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong in September, October, and November 2014 
115  South China Morning Post, see note 100.
116  Albert Cheng, “End occupation of Hong Kong and focus on mass electoral cam-
paign for democracy”, South China Morning Post, 20 November 2014, available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1644569/end-occupation-
hong-kong-and-focus-mass-electoral-campaign, accessed 11 April 2019 (referring to 
Professor Kin-man Chan).
117  Michelle Chen & James Pomfret, “Hong Kong Occupy founders urge students 
to retreat amid fears of violence”, Reuters, 1 December 2014, available at: https://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-hongkong-china/hong-kong-occupy-founders-urge-stu-
dents-to-retreat-amid-fears-of-violence-idUKKCN0JG0BG20141202, accessed on 
11 April 2019. 
118  Chris Buckley, “Leaders of Hong Kong Democracy Campaign Urge Students to 
Retreat”, New York Times, 2 December 2014, available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/12/03/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html, accessed 11 April 2019.
119  Gary Cheung, “Overwhelming majority of Hongkongers want Occupy protests 
to end: survey”, South China Morning Post, 19 November 2014, available at: https://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1643998/overwhelming-majority-hong-
kongers-want-occupy-protests-end-survey, accessed 11April 2019.
120  See Peter So, “Public support for Occupy movement growing, survey shows”, 
South China Morning Post, 22 October 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/
news/hong-kong/article/1622223/occupy-movement-continuing-gain-momentum-
survey-shows, accessed 11 April 2019. 
Jeffrey E. Thomas
164
showed support was up in October, but opposition to the movement 
exceeded support for it by November. Figure 3, below, shows the 
proportion of respondents that supported and opposed the movement 
over those three months.
Figure 3. Survey Results from Chinese University of Hong Kong121
Figure 3 shows that in September, support for Occupy Central was 
modest and opposition was fairly strong. By mid-October, however, 
the support for the movement was greater than the opposition. By 
November, those gains had mostly been lost, and the trend was likely 
downward. The survey was conducted November 5-11,122 prior to the 
attack on the building housing the Legislative Council, an event that 
likely eroded public support even more. By the time the courts had 
issued orders for the occupation to end, it was clear that the costs of the 
movement were outstripping its potential benefits, and this was evident 
121  The data for this figure came from a press release from the Centre for Commu-
nication and Public Opinion Survey of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 16 
November 2014, available at:  http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/
TaskForce20141116-e.pdf, accessed 11 April 2019, p.7. The following categories 
were combined: Strongly support and Quite support for Support, Strong not support 
and Quite not support for Oppose, and So-so and No Opinion/Refuse to answer for 
Neutral/no opinion. 
122  Ibid. 
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to many in the movement. By late November, half of protesters were 
ready to retreat if asked by the student organizations involved in the 
movement.123 Thus, concerns about the impact on the community, along 
with concerns about efficacy and the safety and comfort of protestors, 
brought the movement to an end. 
V. CONCLUSION
Occupy Central was a remarkable social movement. While its 
implications will continue to be studied and debated, it provides an 
example of a large number of people exercising their rights to freedom 
of expression and freedom of association in a society with Asian cultural 
characteristics. While the exercise of these freedoms is consistent with 
protection of fundamental rights expected from a society committed 
to the rule of law, the particulars of the movement in Hong Kong were 
also consistent with Asian cultural commitment to the community. The 
motivation for the movement was to promote the community’s ability to 
nominate candidates for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, not to protect 
individual freedoms. The manner in which the protesters exercised their 
rights also reflected a concern for the rights of the community. While 
the occupation caused traffic problems and other inconveniences, the 
movement worked to reduce or eliminate the negative impact to the 
community. The protesters directed traffic, cleaned up after themselves, 
and made arrangements to keep the peace. After 79 remarkable days of 
occupation, and in the face of court orders to disband the occupation, it 
became clear that the costs to the community and to the protesters were 
too great, and that it was time to retreat and work within the community. 
That was a significant factor in the decision to retreat. In the aftermath 
of the movement, its organizers have been convicted of inciting a public 
nuisance because the court determined that the inconvenience to the 
public outweighed the rights of the protesters to exercise their freedom 
through the occupation.  
This concern about the community was consistent with Hong 
123  Jeffie Lam & Alan Yu, “Half of Occupy Central protestors ready to pack it in if 
asked by organisers”, South China Morning Post, 20 November 2014, available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1644902/half-occupy-central-pro-
testers-ready-pack-it-if-asked-organisers, accessed 11 April 11, 2019.
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Kong’s cultural commitment to the interests of the community as 
measured by Hofstede’s Individualism score. Hong Kong’s score of 25 
for Individualism is similar to other Asian countries and much lower 
than countries in Europe-North America. This shows that Hong Kong’s 
culture, compared to cultures in Europe-North America, puts a higher 
value on community interests and a lower value on individual interests. 
This Asian commitment to the community as compared to individuals 
is reflected in the fundamental rights scores of Asian countries in the 
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. Although Hong Kong in 
many respects resembles European and North American countries in 
its commitment to rule of law, its scores for fundamental rights, and 
for freedom of expression and freedom of association, are significantly 
lower. This is true for other countries in Asia as well. Japan has the 
highest overall score in Asia on the Rule of Law Index (excluding 
Australia and New Zealand as being culturally distinct), but its score 
on Fundamental Rights, a respectable 0.78, is still substantially lower 
than about half of the Europe-North America countries. In light of the 
Asian cultural commitment to community interests, which is reflected 
in Occupy Central narrative, it seems unlikely that Asian countries 
will never earn scores among the highest for fundamental rights on the 
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. This conclusion is not meant 
to be a criticism; ultimately, each culture must strike a balance between 
individual and community interests. While the World Justice Project 
may emphasize the importance of protection of certain individual rights, 
that may be a reflection of the values of those involved in developing 
the measures rather than a universal consensus.  
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Appendix 1. Individualism Correlated Freedom of Expression, 
Freedom of Association and Fundamental Rights 124
Europe-North America (including Australia and New Zealand)
Country Individualism Expression Association
Fundamental 
Rights
US 91 0.81 0.83 0.72
Australia 90 0.8 0.82 0.79
UK 89 0.85 0.89 0.81
Netherlands 80 0.84 0.86 0.84
Canada 80 0.86 0.88 0.83
Hungary 80 0.48 0.48 0.58
New Zealand 79 0.83 0.83 0.8
Italy 76 0.69 0.79 0.73
Belgium 75 0.81 0.86 0.84
Denmark 74 0.96 0.98 0.9
Swedan 71 0.85 0.88 0.86
France 71 0.73 0.82 0.74
Norway 69 0.93 0.94 0.88
Germany 67 0.85 0.9 0.85
Finland 63 0.91 0.93 0.92
Estonia 60 0.8 0.84 0.83
Poland 60 0.62 0.63 0.66
Czech Repub 58 0.74 0.79 0.78
Austria 55 0.8 0.82 0.84
Spain 51 0.72 0.82 0.78
Greece 35 0.69 0.76 0.66
Croatia 33 0.64 0.75 0.65
Romania 30 0.68 0.67 0.7
Bulgaria 30 0.61 0.67 0.6
Portugal 27 0.81 0.86 0.79
Slovenia 27 0.55 0.55 0.73
Correlation with Individualism: Europe-N.Am. 0.453418392 0.392863997 0.377158795
    t value E-NA 2.439721299 2.048843561 1.953023545
    p value E-NA 0.02213121 0.051112294 0.062097292
124  Data for the Appendix comes from the Geert Hofstede website and from the World 
Justice Project. For the Geert Hofstede data on Individualism, see note 47. For the 
World Justice Project data, see note 33. Correlations, t values and p values were cal-
culated using formulae in an excel spreadsheet. 
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East Asia and the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
Country Individualism Expression Association
Fundamental 
Rights
Japan 46 0.72 0.73 0.78
Philippines 32 0.56 0.57 0.42
Malaysia 26 0.46 0.44 0.48
Hong Kong 25 0.57 0.62 0.66
Singapore 20 0.5 0.49 0.69
Thailand 20 0.52 0.46 0.48
China 20 0.12 0.17 0.32
South Korea 18 0.65 0.69 0.74
Indonesia 14 0.67 0.66 0.52
Cambodia NA 0.31 0.41 0.35
Mongolia NA 0.63 0.68 0.58
Myanmar NA 0.4 0.35 0.31
Correlation with Individualism: All 0.639902409 0.64075847 0.613405491
    t value all 4.783564182 4.794416177 4.461747852
    p value all 3.48569E-05 3.37645E-05 8.92216E-05
   
Correlation with Individualism: Asia 0.297269048 0.320331396 0.307092647
    t value Asia 0.823738081 0.894660879 0.853744006
    p value Asia 0.437250083 0.400683059 0.421498309
